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High stakes testing has been long established in the English school system.  
In this article, we seek to demonstrate how testing has become pivotal to 
securing the neo-liberal restructuring of schools, that commenced during 
the Thatcher era, and is reaching a critical point at the current time. 
Central to this project has been the need to assert increased control over 
teachers’ work and this is being achieved through a pincer movement 
of marketisation and managerialism. Both of these ‘policy technologies’ 
require the value of individual teachers’ work to be measured and 
quantified, and in this article we seek to demonstrate how high stakes 
testing underpins these processes. The article concludes by making the 
case for reclaiming teaching as a professional process, within the context 
of education, as a public good and conducted in a public space.
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still vary from system to system. In an English context, West states:
The national tests taken at the age of 11 and the public examinations taken at the 
ages	of	16	and	18	can	be	considered	to	be	‘high	stakes’.	Such	tests	determine,	or	
help	to	determine,	the	future	of	pupils,	teachers	or	schools.	(2010,	p.25)







a	 downward	 pressure	 on	 public	 spending	 has	 driven	 an	 intensification	 of	 teachers’	
labour	 process,	 whilst	 the	 perceived	 imperative	 to	 perform	 highly	 in	 international	
league	tables	has	narrowed	the	focus	of	teaching	and	learning.	These	issues	are	nested	
within	a	wider	set	of	ideological	struggles	over	the	purposes	and	future	of	education.	
These	 are	 struggles	 that	 are	 intensifying	 as	 the	 neo-liberal	 drive	 towards	 systemic	
privatisation becomes more apparent. Given these developments, the imperative 







in	 an	 article	 published	 over	 10	 years	 ago,	 and	 widely	 cited	 since,	 Stephen	 Ball	
argued	 that	new	policy	 technologies	were	not	only	 re-shaping	 teachers’	 experience	
of	work,	but	what	it	meant	to	‘be	a	teacher’	(Ball,	2003).	Ball	identified	three	specific	
policy technologies: the market, managerialism and performativity, arguing in a 
later	contribution	 that,	 ‘They	 interrelate	and	complement	one	another	and	work	on	
individual	practitioners,	work	groups	and	whole	organisations	 to	reconstitute	social	
relations, forms of esteem and value, sense of purpose and notions of excellence and 
good	practice’	 (Ball,	 2008	p.	 42).	 in	 the	2003	article,	Ball	 focused	his	 analysis	on	
performativity	as	a	policy	technology	that	had	a	particular	impact	on	re-casting	teachers’	
identities.	 He	 further	 argued	 that	 the	 balance	 between	 the	 different	 technologies	
differed	between	national	contexts,	but	their	growing	influence	represented	a	global,	
and	globalising,	phenomenon.	in	this	article,	we	seek	to	draw	on	Ball’s	use	of	policy	




featured much less, namely marketisation and managerialism. Our argument is that 
in	 England,	 in	 the	 period	 since	 2003,	 and	 particularly	 in	 the	 period	 following	 the	
election of the Coalition government in 2010, it is the pincer movement of markets 
and	managerialism	that	have	combined	to	effectively	and	radically	re-shape	teachers’	
experience	of	work.	if	teachers’	identities	are	being	re-framed,	and	we	believe	they	
are, it is the dual-drive of marketisation and managerialism that is shaping that 
experience.	The	 two	 elements	 are	 distinct,	 but	 are	 interdependent.	They	work	 in	 a	
complementary	way	to	shape	teachers’	work,	determining	what	teachers	do	and	how	
they	do	it.	Furthermore,	what	both	have	in	common	is	a	dependency	on	high	stakes	











The article begins by providing a contextual background in relation to the development 
of a high stakes testing system in England. We then argue that such testing has 
been	 necessary	 to	 transform	 teachers’	 labour	 into	 a	 product	 that	 can	 be	 quantified	
and	 measured,	 before	 demonstrating	 how	 the	 quantification	 of	 teachers’	 labour	 is	
fundamental to the creation of both marketised and managerialist modes of control. 
The	paper	concludes	by	offering	a	more	optimistic	vision	of	what	teaching	might	look	
like and some of the challenges that need to be confronted if the current trajectory of 
policy is to be interrupted.




school	 systems	 of	Wales,	Northern	 ireland	 and	 Scotland	 look	 quite	 different	 from	
that in England, and these differences are perhaps at their sharpest in relation to the 
ways	in	which	students	are	tested,	and	the	ways	in	which	test	data	are	used	for	wider	
purposes.	This	 important	point	highlights	 the	need	to	 locate	policy	within	a	global,	
and globalising, context, but recognising that policy enactments assume very different 
forms	in	local	contexts	(rizvi	and	Lingard,	2010).














18 year olds to the present day, albeit in revised form. That reform of both exams is 




in	small	pockets	of	 the	country,	 the	11+	has	 remained	 intact	as	some	Conservative	
Party controlled localities retained a selective system of grammar schools and 
secondary	moderns.	However,	for	the	vast	majority	of	the	country	this	system	came	
under	challenge	in	the	1960s.	The	introduction	of	open	entry	comprehensive	schools	
obviated	 the	need	 for	 a	 selective	 exam	at	 11,	whilst	 the	 introduction	of	 the	GCSE	




progressive	 reform	 (Lowe,	 2007).	 However,	 its	 introduction	 coincided	 with	 the	
introduction	 of	 the	 1988	 Education	 reform	Act	 (see	 Gillard	 2011),	 which	 had	 a	
very	different	impact	on	the	school	system.	This	was	the	single	piece	of	legislation	
that redirected the English school system on a very different trajectory from the 
comprehensive,	 welfarist	 principles	 that	 had	 developed	 in	 the	 post-war	 period.	










key mechanism for ensuring school accountability. 
The	1988	Act	was	 introduced	by	 a	Conservative	government	 committed	 to	 radical	
neo-liberal	restructuring	of	public	education,	and	was	one	element	of	a	much	more	
fundamental	restructuring	of	the	welfare	state	(Gough,	1983).	However,	the	election	









national inspection regime has become central to linking processes of marketisation 
with	managerialism.	The	national	inspectorate	in	its	modern	form	was	established	in	
the	years	following	the	1988	Act	and	is	known	as	the	office	for	Standards	in	Education	
(ofsted).	The	 role	 of	ofsted	 is	 to	 hold	 schools	 accountable	 for	 the	 education	 they	
46













to be acceptable. Such measures are crude in nature as the targets take no account of 
the demographics, starting points, and potential barriers to learning that some cohorts 
of students face. An example of this type of crude target is that in the 2012-13 academic 
year,	all	secondary	schools	had	to	ensure	that	40%	of	their	students	passed	5	GCSE	
examinations	 (including	Maths	and	English)	at	a	grade	C	or	above,	with	 the	 target	
rising	to	50%	by	2015	regardless	of	the	entry	profile	of	students.	Schools	which	do	not	
meet these targets are not only put under more intense scrutiny by Ofsted, but are also 
more	likely	to	be	given	a	‘notice	to	improve’,	or	placed	in	‘special	measures’.	Such	
scenarios	open	up	the	possibility	of	a	school	being	forcibly	‘academised’,	whereby	the	
school is removed from local authority control and its governing body is replaced by an 
imposed	‘trust’.	in	many	cases,	‘forced	academisation’	involves	handing	responsibility	
for	the	school	to	a	private	sector	sponsor	and	so	the	intimate	connection	between	high	





TEACHERS’ LABOUR: THE QUANTIfICATION Of VALUE AND 
THE QUEST fOR CONTROL
In order to understand the pivotal role played by high stakes testing in asserting 
control	over	teachers’	work,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	political	right’s	critique	
of	‘professionalism’	and	the	role	of	producer	interests.	For	those	on	the	political	right,	
accountability	 is	based	within	 the	market,	and	 the	accountability	of	 the	producer	 is	





the disciplinary control of market forces. Without the constraints imposed by market 







For	 the	 right,	 schools	 were	 always	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 producer	 capture	
because	of	difficulties	associated	with	placing	any	clear	value	on	the	work	of	teachers	
(Friedman	and	Friedman	1980).	This	point	was	recognised	by	Connell,	who	argued:	
Teaching	 is	 a	 labour	 process	 without	 an	 object.	 At	 best	 it	 has	 an	 object	 so	




many pensions paid, so many dollars turned over, so many patients cured. The 
‘outcomes	of	teaching’,	to	use	the	jargon	of	educational	research,	are	notoriously	
difficult	to	measure.	(Connell,	1985,	p.70).	










that	 all	 labour	processes	must	 be	deconstructed	 and	 subject	 to	 ‘scientific’	 analysis.	














when	 a	worker’s	 ability	 to	work	 is	 transformed	 into	productive	 labour.	Braverman	
argued	that	‘control’	of	the	labour	process	was	the	central	challenge	for	management,	
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understood	 as	 the	 type	 of	 ‘new	 professionalism’	 identified	 in	 policy	 documents	 in	
which,	high	levels	of	skill	and	professional	judgement	are	valued	(riG,	2005).	rather	
we	seek	 to	argue	 that	since	 the	mid-1980s,	when	Connell	described	 teachers’	work	
as	‘a	labour	process	without	an	object’,	there	has	been	a	relentless	drive	to	quantify	




that is central to these mechanisms of control.
HIgH STAkES TESTINg, MARkETISATION AND TEACHERS’ 
WORk.





implementation	 of	 the	 1988	 Education	 reform	Act.	 it	 was	 the	 1988	Act	 that	 not	
only	introduced	testing	at	7,	11,	14	and	16	(based	on	the	newly	established	National	





that the period since then has seen the market become progressively more embedded. 
At	the	time	of	writing,	these	processes	have	developed	further	as	local	authorities’	role	








The	 logic	 reflects	elementary	market	economic	 theory.	 ‘Consumers’	 require	market	
information in order to make rational choices. Published test results, ranked in league 
tables,	 facilitate	 ‘like-for-like’	 comparison,	 whilst	 open	 enrolment	 allows	 parents	
to	 exercise	 choice.	 Formula-funding,	 driven	 overwhelmingly	 by	 pupil	 numbers,	
ensures that high performing schools generate large numbers of parental preferences, 
and	with	them	additional	resources.	By	contrast,	schools	ranked	lower	in	the	league	
tables	 are	 likely	 to	 attract	 fewer	 parental	 preferences	 and	 hence,	 face	 falling	 rolls,	
and diminishing budgets. Within this quasi- market, high stakes testing is central. 
Just	as	the	economic	market	requires	a	communicative	signal	between	producers	and	
consumers, so too does the educational quasi-market require an equivalent. Therefore, 
published test scores perform a similar, although not equivalent function to price in the 
market for school education. In particular, test scores represent a valorisation of value 
in	the	school	system	–	a	numerical	expression	of	a	school’s	output	that	acts	as	a	signal	
to consumers as they are encouraged to express their preferences. In this sense, test 
scores	form	a	crucial	element	in	the	new	educational	landscape	as	the	invisible	hand	
of the market replaces more visible, and democratic, forms of planning and provision.
However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 this	 is	 not a value determined by the 
interaction of supply and demand in the traditional sense, and therefore it cannot be 
considered a traditional exchange value. Rather it might more accurately be presented 
as	 the	quantification	of	a	use	value	where	 the	use	value	 is	determined	by	 the	state.	
Within	 the	 English	 school	 ‘market’,	 it	 is	 the	 state	 that	 determines	what	 counts	 as	
‘official	knowledge’	(Apple,	2000)	(what	is	taught,	what	knowledge	is	privileged	and	
how	 ‘outputs’	 are	measured	 and	 represented	 in	 the	 form	 of	 test	 scores	 and	 league	
tables)	and	therefore,	it	is	the	state	that	determines	use	value	in	education.	High	stakes	
tests	become	 the	means	by	which	use	value	 is	measured	and	valorised	 (powerfully	
reinforced	 by	 ofsted’s	 use	 of	 categories	 to	 reinforce	 the	 official	 view	 of	 ‘good’).	
Therefore, the quasi- market in school education cannot claim to be a representation 
of	what	consumers	want,	but	 rather	what	 the	state	asserts	 they	should	want.	 in	 the	
current	English	school	system,	there	is	great	play	made	of	‘freedom’,	‘de-regulation’	








the landscape of schools policy in England, the free market is never far from the strong 
state,	and	the	market’s	so-called	‘invisible	hand’	still	retains	a	vice-like	grip	on	those	
who	make	 a	 determined	 effort	 to	 fashion	 a	 genuine	 alternative	 to	 state	 sanctioned	
‘good’.
Given the above policy environment, schools are forced to focus their efforts on 
maximising	‘outputs’	to	retain	market	position.	in	market	terms,	institutional	survival	
50
Markets, managerialism and teachers’ work
depends	 on	market	 success.	As	 a	 consequence	 the	 ‘results	 imperative’	 impacts	 on	
both	 the	 leadership	and	 teaching	processes	of	 schools,	particularly	when	under	 the	
forensic	gaze	of	 the	 school	 inspectorate,	 as	occurs	when	a	 school	 is	 deemed	 to	be	
failing	(Perryman,	2006).	The	intensification	of	market	forces	is	intended	to	place	an	
increased pressure on teachers to improve test scores and for teachers to make this the 
central	focus	of	their	work.	However,	it	is	increasingly	apparent	that	the	intensification	
of market pressures in the system has had a range of other consequences on teacher 
behaviour.	For	example,	there	is	now	an	increasing	recognition	that	so-called	‘gaming’	
in	the	system	has	been	widespread,	whereby	dubious	educational	practices	are	adopted	
in order to optimise market performance and position. These have included the use of 
admissions	criteria,	which	are	used	by	some	to	skew	their	student	populations	to	the	
advantage	of	their	results	in	high	stakes	testing,	(West	et	al,	2004;	West	et	al,	2006),	
the focus of additional support to students on key performance threshold borderlines, 
and the improper use of student exclusions to manipulate aggregate results. To date, 




assessments	 (ofqual,	 2012).	 These	 are	 sometimes	 presented	 as	 the	 ‘unintended	
consequences’	 of	 policy	 as	 though	 somehow	 their	 occurrence	 could	 not	 have	been	
anticipated.	‘Perverse	incentives’	are	acknowledged,	but	can	apparently	be	regulated	
























a system that has often generated a raft of internal testing to track student progress 
forensically	at	all	points	across	 their	 school	career	 (allowing	so-called	value-added	






instrument of annual public testing.  This process has in turn been formally embedded 
in the structures of performance management and the near ubiquitous development 
of data management systems in schools. These ever more complex systems require 
teachers’	performance	to	be	annually	appraised	by	senior	leaders	within	schools	and	
targets for future performance set. In reality, the process is often experienced as one of 




of	 curriculum	 areas).	 For	 some	 time,	 performance	management	 has	made	 explicit	
links	to	teachers’	pay,	links	that	have	become	progressively	more	entwined	over	time	
(Carter	et	al	2010).	More	recently,	this	process	has	accelerated	whereby	any	automatic	
pay progression based on length of service is being removed, thereby ensuring that 
all	pay	progression	is	performance-related	(STrB,	2012).	one	head	teachers’	union	




the commentary of one of the large unions representing classroom teachers highlights 
the issues:
The	 NAHT	 model	 policy	 requires	 teachers	 to	 make	 “good	 progress	 towards	
objectives”, be competent in all areas of the relevant Standards and achieve a 
grading	 of	 “good”	 in	 classroom	 observations.	 Furthermore,	 it	 suggests	 that	








the focus for professional discussion.
What	 is	 arguably	most	 developed	 and	widespread	 is	 the	 extent	 to	which	 teachers’	
labour	has	intensified	as	a	result	of	the	increased	pressure	to	deliver	specified	levels	
52
Markets, managerialism and teachers’ work
of performance as judged by student achievement in external standardised tests. The 
external	tests	are	the	‘public	face’	of	the	assessment	regime,	but	are	built	upon	constant	
internal	 testing	 of	 students	 used	 to	 ‘train’	 them	 in	 the	 culture	 of	 assessment.	 our	
argument is that this represents the operationalisation of the fundamental elements of 
scientific	management,	whereby	managerial	control	of	the	labour	process	is	asserted	
firstly	 by	 finding	ways	 to	 quantify	 the	 value	 of	 individual	 employees’	 output,	 and	
secondly,	by	linking	productivity	and	performance	to	pay	(Chamberlin	et	al,	2002).	
All	 of	 these	 essential	 elements	 of	Taylorist	 scientific	management	 are	 now	 deeply	
embedded	in	the	English	school	system	allowing	student	performance	in	tests	(both	
external	and	 internal)	 to	not	only	determine	merit	payments,	but	now	 to	determine	
whether	 basic	 annual	 increments	 are	 secured	 or	 withheld.	 The	 Chief	 inspector	 of	
Schools	 has	 denied	 that	 the	ofsted	 framework	 implies	 a	 ‘one	 best	way’	model	 of	
teaching	 (scientific	management	par excellence)	 (ofsted,	 2012b),	 although	 teacher	




in	 tests	 of	 all	 types	 is	 a	 substantial	 transfer	 of	 power	 and	 authority	 to	 the	 school	
Principal.	There	can	be	little	doubt	that	within	the	current	English	school	system,	the	
‘frontier	of	control’	(Goodrich,	1920)	has	shifted	decisively	and	that	within	schools,	
power	 and	 control	 has	 transferred	 upwards.	What	 appears	 to	 be	 happening	 is	 that	
a much more coercive and aggressive approach to management is evident in many 
schools.	However,	establishing	the	precise	extent	and	consequences	of	this	is	difficult.	
researching	the	‘dark	side’	(Brooks,	2005)	of	schools	as	organisations	has	never	been	
easy,	but	 it	 is	arguably	becoming	more	difficult	as	 ‘brand-conscious’	head-teachers	
become	more	wary	of	approaches	by	potentially	critical	researchers.	At	the	moment,	
the	picture	we	present	here	draws	on	occasional	evidence	 that	appears	 in	 the	press	
(see	Times Educational Supplement,	2013)	or	from	teacher	union	disputes	(see	Ealing 
Gazette,	 2013).	one	 fascinating	 source	 of	 data	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	The Guardian 
newspaper’s	‘Secret Teacher’.	The	secret	 teacher	 is	 in	fact	not	a	single	 teacher,	but	
rather	the	term	provides	a	cover	by	which	teachers	are	able	to	provide	anonymised	








compliance are potentially high, teachers have little option but to conform to meeting 
the	demands	of	a	system	over	which	they	have	ever	diminishing	influence.	Managerial	
control	of	teachers’	work	is	complete,	whilst	resistance	is	made	more	difficult	by	the	




INTEgRATINg MARkETS AND MANAgERIALISM: fAILURE, 
fRAgMENTATION AND fEAR.
We	 have	 endeavoured	 to	 illustrate	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 processes	 of	
marketisation	 and	 managerialism	 have	 increasingly	 shaped	 teachers’	 experience	
of	work	 in	 the	English	 school	 system.	Each	of	 these	 elements	 is	 distinct,	 but	 both	
are	clearly	 interdependent,	with	each	both	shaping,	and	being	shaped	by,	 the	other.	
Our argument is that the processes of marketisation and managerialism are threaded 
together by narratives of failure, fragmentation and fear, and it is these discourses that 




















teacher against teacher. Shared interests and identities are fractured as those considered 
‘successful’	 are	 encouraged	 to	 set	 themselves	 apart	 from	 those	who	 ‘fail’.	 in	 such	
contexts, any basis for solidarity is inevitably, and intentionally, undermined.
None	of	the	above	has	serious	consequences	unless	it	is	underpinned	by	fear.	Failure	
must have consequences. In a market, the very real threat of failure is meant to 




individual	 teachers	are	confronted	with	 ‘notices	 to	 improve’,	and	 formal	capability	
procedures are much more readily invoked. This need to introduce a real sense of fear 
into	the	public	sector	was	articulated	explicitly	by	one	Coalition	government	minister:
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You	 can’t	 have	 room	 for	 innovation	 and	 the	 pressure	 for	 excellence	 without	
having some real discipline and some fear on the part of the providers that 
things	may	go	wrong	if	they	don’t	live	up	to	the	aims	that	society	as	a	whole	is	
demanding	of	them	(Public	Service,	2011).
The	 Minister’s	 convictions	 are	 clear	 –	 real discipline can only be effective in a 
context	 where	 there	 is	 fear, because failure has consequences. In such a climate, 
the fear of failure not only drives a compulsion to conform, but fragmentation and 
division	generate	a	fear	of	resisting.	resistance	and	defiance	are	behaviours	that,	in	









AN ALTERNATIVE fUTURE - RECLAIMINg TEACHINg 
Biesta	 (2010)	 highlights	 the	marked	 impact	 that	 the	measurement	 culture	 has	 had	
on all levels of education, from international policy to the individual classroom. He 









results in a lack of diversity, and a focus on test results as a proxy for the performance 
of teachers:
The	rise	of	a	culture	of	performativity	in	education	–	a	culture	in	which	means	
become ends in themselves so that targets and indicators of quality become 
mistaken for quality itself – has been one of the main drivers of an approach to 
measurement	in	which	normative	validity	is	being	replaced	by	technical	validity	
(Biesta,	2010,	p.13).
The constant use of high stakes testing leads to an underlying system of measurement 
and	control	(o’Neill,	2002),	where	teachers	become	ever	more	focused	on	short-term	
gains and ultimately to an ever greater pressure to teach to the test. We argue that 
as high stakes testing becomes the core of measurement, so the curriculum needs 
to	 align	 to	 this	 philosophy,	 constantly	 being	 refined	 to	 ‘fine-tune’	 the	 outcomes	
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by	Hargreaves	 and	Fullan	 (2012)	 as	 one	 based	on	 ‘business	 capital’.	This	 view	of	
education	sees	the	teacher	as	someone	who	works	hard,	but	undertakes	a	task	that	only	
requires moderate intellectual and academic ability. Teaching processes and decisions 
are	taken	on	the	basis	of	numeric	data	and	what	has	been	deemed	to	work	elsewhere,	
and	 ultimately	 comes	 down	 to	 hard	work	 and	measureable	 results.	 However,	 as	 a	
consequence, teachers are not seen as highly educated professionals and can be 
dispensed	with	easily,	their	places	to	be	filled	by	others	keen	to	be	teachers,	‘This is 








as	 their	 basis	 for	 accountability,	 and	 for	 ‘sorting’	 children	 as	 they	 move	 through	
the education system? And as a by-product of a different system, can the role of 
the teacher be enhanced, thereby raising both educational standards and teaching 
quality?	Hargreaves	and	Fullan	(2012)	highlight	flaws	in	the	U.S.	education	system,	
predominantly focused on an overreliance on standardised measurement and a focus 
on the individual, particularly in relation to issues such as performance related pay. 
instead,	they	argue	that	the	development	of	meaningful	collaboration	between	teachers,	





interference and intervention, competition, marketisation and over-testing. After such 
a	long	period,	these	systems	still	cling	to	the	idea	that	this	is	the	one	best	way.	our	view	
is	that	this	is	because	educational	reform	has	not	been	driven	by	what	is	in	the	best	
interests of all children, but by the interests of business and the drive to privatisation.
In contrast, some emerging and rapidly developing economies such as China and 
Singapore	have	started	down	a	very	different	road,	with	diversified	assessment,	local	
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only	high-stakes	 tests	 they	face	are	 taken	at	 the	age	of	18,	 the	results	of	which	are	
used	 for	 determining	 university	 entry.	 However,	 even	 here,	 testing	 results	 are	 not	
used	to	hold	teachers	to	account,	they	are	the	responsibility	of	the	students	who	have	
taken	 them.	 in	 both	 Finland	 and	 Singapore,	 teachers	 are	 held	 in	 high	 esteem,	 are	
seen	as	central	 to	 the	social	and	economic	development	of	 the	nations	and	work	in	
collaboration as highly skilled professionals to improve the education of the children 
with	whom	they	work.	Trust,	professionalism	and	essentially	dialogic	systems	lead	to	
high comparative international educational outcomes. High stakes testing has either 
no place or is declining in these systems. There is a conscious focus on the quality 
and development of learning, as opposed to cramming students through high stakes 
testing. Accountability still exists but is attained through dialogue and support for 
teachers. Markets have no place, and consequently there is no need for large scale 
measurement	 to	 feed	 into	 systems	of	 ‘choice’.	The	hand	whose	 invisibility	hides	a	
powerful	 pressure	 to	 control,	 potentially	 becomes	 transformed	 into	 a	 helping	 hand	
focused on support and achievement for all.
What becomes apparent is that there are diverging paths in the rapidly globalising 
education policy environment. Some systems become dominated by business 
capital models, creating ever more elaborate accountability systems fed by constant 
‘measurement’	of	teachers	and	students,	and	which	make	use	of	high	stakes	testing,	an	
ever expanding and valuable industry to a burgeoning private sector. As this inevitably 
leads	to	criticism	of	standards	and	the	quality	of	education,	however	narrowly	defined,	
the professional standing of teachers is diminished. As such, marketised systems 
slowly	spin	into	spirals	of	decline.	England	is	in	the	vanguard	of	this	tradition.
The	alternative	future	is	one	which	sees	the	professional	capital	of	teachers	as	a	driver	
for improvement and incremental change. Such change is also based on the foundation 
of education being seen as a social good, as opposed to an economic opportunity. In 
this alternative system, the focus is on learning, leading to a spectrum of assessment 
types	 which	 have	 an	 authentic	 character,	 and	 which	 perversely	 will	 have	 greater	
utility	 in	 the	wider	world	 beyond	 school.	 it	 is	 in	 this	wider	 debate	 concerning	 the	
nature of assessment, and its relationship to both management of education and the 




the combination of failure, fragmentation and fear are intended to undermine the 
solidarities	that	might	offer	resistance	to	this	agenda.	However,	our	belief	is	that	such	
possibilities exist. The drive to an intense market model in schools, underpinned by 





public education system in England continues apace diverse loci of dissent overcome, 
their	historic	divisions	and	alliances	of	resistance	begin	to	coalesce.	At	this	point,	new	
possibilities emerge.
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